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The Access and Processing of Idiomatic Expressions
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Tw o experiments  examined the nature  o f  access, storage,  and com prehens ion  o f  idiomatic 
phrases.  In both studies a Phrase Classification Task was utilized. In this, reaction times to 
determine whether  or  not word strings const i tu ted acceptable English phrases were measured.  
Classification times were significantly faster to idiom than to matched contro l  phrases.  This  
effect held under  condi t ions  involving different categories o f  idioms, different t ransi t ional  
probabil i t ies am o n g  words  in the phrases,  and  different levels o f  awareness  o f  the presence o f  
idioms in the materials.  The  da ta  suppor t  a Lexical Representa t ion  Hypothesis  for the processing 
o f  idioms.
Investigation of  the processes underlying 
sentence comprehension has tended, under­
standably enough, to consider the more simple 
cases which confront the listener. For  ex­
ample, examinations of  lexical processing 
during sentence comprehension have typically 
employed words with straightforward and 
easily derived interpretations. While an im­
portant  exception to this rule is the study of 
lexical ambiguities, even this work deals with 
words which possess relatively well-defined 
literal meanings. There is, however, a large 
class of  items— including idioms, metaphors,  
and proverbs— which are extraordinarily 
common in the language but which have been 
largely ignored in comprehension research; 
the few attempts to discover how the compre-
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hension device computes nonliteral meanings 
for these items have found them to be rem ark­
ably intractable. The high frequency of oc­
currence of  nonliteral materials alone necessi­
tates that the processes responsible for their 
cbmprehension be incorporated in any co m ­
plete comprehension model. Idioms, in p a r ­
ticular, present an important  challenge to 
those interested in building a performance 
model for sentence comprehension, and the 
purpose of  this paper is to examine some of 
the basic aspects of how we come to under­
stand idiomatic expressions.
In order to see the nature of the problems 
that idioms raise for the comprehension de­
vice it is first necessary to consider exactly 
what constitutes an idiom. In its simplest form 
an idiom is a string of  two or more words for 
which meaning is not derived from the mean- 
ings of  the individual words comprising that 
string. Thus, the idiomatic meaning of  “ kick 
the bucket"  has little to do with the meanings 
of  either “ kick" or “ bucket" ;  similarly, the 
meaning of “ by and large" has little to do 
with the meanings of  either “ large" or “ by."
Thus,  by and large, idioms defy traditional 
concepts of  syntactic and semantic analysis,
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thereby creating problems for both perform­
ance and linguistic models. These problems 
are somewhat amplified by the fact that some 
idiom strings are not syntactically well 
formed— often violating both selectional and 
subcategorizational restrictions which exist in 
grammatical theory.
Were these problems the only ones, perhaps 
they could be handled within the coniines of 
existing theory (although that is not at all a 
certainty). However, most idioms also have 
the characteristic of  ambiguity. That  is, g ram ­
matical (well formed) idioms, such as “ kick 
the bucket, '  have an acceptable literal read­
ing for the word string which is derivable by 
traditional syntactic/semantic analysis as well 
as an idiomatic reading which cannot be 
derived from such analysis. The problem is 
thus one of  developing a comprehension 
model for dealing with phrases which are 
simultaneously amenable and nonamenable  
to traditional compositional analysis.
Those few attempts to deal with the p rob ­
lems posed by idioms for linguistic theory 
have largely revolved around studying the 
susceptibility of  idioms to traditional t rans­
formational and semantic analysis. Most of 
these at tempts have focused on grammatical 
idioms, and two general (and opposing) 
themes can be discerned. One is that idioms 
should be treated as a separate, specialized 
list o f  items, which have special insertion 
privileges in the g ram m ar  (see, e.g., New- 
meyer, 1972; Weinreich, 1967). The other 
position holds that idioms should be treated 
as single lexical items which have much the 
same characteristics in the g ram m ar  as do 
any other lexical items (see. e.g., Fraser, 
1974: Heringer, 1976). Fraser has refined 
this latter proposal with the suggestion that 
idioms do not form a homogeneous class 
with respect to transformations which they 
may undergo. He has categorized idioms on 
a continuum ranging from those which will 
not undergo even the most simple t ransform a­
tion and still retain their idiomatic meaning 
(e.g., “ by and large," “ face the music") to
those which undergo nearly all traditional 
transformational  changes without losing their 
idiomatic reading (e.g., “ throw in the 
sponge").  While linguistic studies such as this 
provide some interesting concepts with which 
to work, it appears fair to comment on the 
current work by noting that  none of  it has 
thus far succeeded in even providing a des­
criptively adequate  account for the class of  
items comprising idioms: the problems raised 
by Chafe (1968) and Weinreich (1967) still 
exist for linguistic theory today. There is not 
space even to at tempt to do justice to the 
extensive linguistic literature on this topic, 
but it appears that at this time this work has 
no finalized contribution to make toward our 
goal o f  building an idiom comprehension 
model.
It has, on the other hand, provided the 
basis for the two general processing models 
which have undergone some experimental 
examination. The first of  these, which can be 
called the Idiom List Hypothesis, holds that 
idioms are stored in (and accessed from) a 
special list which is not part of  the normal 
lexicon. Access from this list takes place via 
what has been called a special “ idiom mode"  
of  processing (Bobrow & Bell. 1973) which 
is seen to differ from a normal,  literal process­
ing mode in terms of  both manner  and 
privilege o f  access. While the exact manner  in 
which idioms are located in this processing 
mode is only vaguely defined, a necessary 
condition on the Idiom List Hypothesis is 
that  a literal analysis is always at tempted on a 
word string before an idiom mode of  p ro ­
cessing is undertaken. It is this factor that 
critically distinguishes this model from other 
models, and the constraint justifies making 
the distinction between an idiom (nonliteral) 
and a literal mode of  processing. It is typic- 
ally assumed that if the comprehension device 
has already been put into a mode o f  idiom 
awareness, then the idiom processing mode 
might, under these circumstances only, be 
called into play before a literal processing 
strategy. Certainly this assumption fits well
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with the intuition that one tends to become 
aware of  the presence o f  a large number  of  
idioms in a conversation once any particular 
idiom has been brought  to one's conscious 
attention.
The second model, which can be labeled the 
Lexical Representation Hypothesis,  holds 
that  idioms are stored and retrieved from the 
lexicon in the same manner  as any other word. 
Thus there is no special idiom list nor any 
special processing mode under  this hypo­
thesis. Rather,  it is assumed that computat ion 
of  both meanings— idiomatic and literal— is 
simultaneously initiated upon occurrence of  
the first word in the idiom string, much as 
appears to occur for lexical ambiguities (see, 
e.g., Foss & Jenkins. 1973; Lackner & 
Garrett ,  1972; Swinney, Note  1). Thus indi­
vidual words are accessed from the lexicon 
and structural analysis is undertaken on these 
words at  the same time that the lexical access 
of  the entire string (which is merely a long 
word) is taking place.
The experimental evidence which currently 
exists appears,  at least on the surface, to favor 
the Idiom List Hypothesis.  Bobrow & Bell 
(1973) examined this hypothesis by employ­
ing a perceptual set paradigm in which sub­
jects either saw a set of  four sentences which 
had only literal interpretations or four sen­
tences which contained idiomatic phrases 
followed by a grammatically idiomatic (and 
therefore ambiguous) sentence. Subjects were 
asked to report which meaning of the g ram ­
matical idiom string they first perceived in 
each of  the conditions. Overall, when these 
were compared to a baseline condition, an 
increase in the number of  “ first perceived" 
idiomatic meanings was reported following 
an idiomatic perceptual set and a similar in­
crease in the number  of  “ first perceived" 
literal meanings occurred following a literal 
set, leading the authors  to claim support  for a 
special “ idiom m ode"  of  processing. The 
reasoning behind this conclusion was that if 
subjects were able to find or to avoid finding 
the idiomatic meaning o f  a sentence by virtue
of the presence of  a processing set (and in the 
absence o f  any specific semantic or syntactic­
ally necessitated choice) separate modes of  
processing must have been called into play.
Similarly, Brannon (Note 2) reported that 
the reaction time needed to decide that  two 
idiomatic sentences had different meanings 
was longer than that  required for a decision 
that  two nonidiomatic sentences differed (the 
idiomatic and nonidiomatic sentences were 
semantically equivalent). Brannon reasoned 
that decision times should only be longer for 
idiom strings if they were undergoing p ro ­
cessing that  was different from (and. perhaps, 
additional to) the processing normally given 
to a string o f  individual lexical items. The 
data, then, seem to support  the hypothesis 
that a literal analysis is first undertaken,  fol­
lowed by a subsequent idiom mode analysis.
While these studies fairly well exhaust the 
experimental literature on the perception of 
idioms themselves, there has been some re­
lated work on the comprehension of other 
nonliteral speech forms. In a study of  con­
versationally conveyed requests, for example, 
Clark and  Lucy (1975) concluded that sub­
jects first comprehend such requests at a 
literal level and then, only if this interpreta­
tion is contextually inappropriate,  construct 
their nonliteral interpretations. This work 
suggests that the type of processing proposed 
in the Idiom List Hypothesis may exist, at 
least for some speech forms.
However, there are at least two factors 
which militate against accepting the Idiom 
List Hypothesis without further investigation. 
The first and most important  of  these is that 
the research supporting the Idiom List H ypo­
thesis has relied exclusively upon post-per­
ceptual measures for support  o f  inferences 
about  ongoing idiom comprehension p ro ­
cesses. A number  of  reasoned arguments  
exist (see, e.g., Cutler and Norris,  1979; 
Garret t .  1970; Marslen-Wilson, 1976)— not 
to mention those supplied by one’s own 
com m on sense— which suggest that moment-  
to-moment processing is reflected quite poorly
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by tasks which are applied after the process 
of  interest has been completed. The second, 
related, factor is that  many such postpercep- 
tual tasks appear  to reflect merely a repro­
cessing and/or  conscious access o f  the mater­
ial under consideration (see Foss & Swinney,
1973, for discussion). In sum, post-perceptual trols. That  is, under this hypothesis the com-
longer, or at least no less time, for g ram m ati ­
cal idioms than for nonidiomatic phrase 
controls. If, on the other hand, the Lexical 
Representation Hypothesis holds, decisions 
made to idiomatic strings should be faster 
than those made to literal word string con-
tasks are not necessarily capable of  suppor t ­
ing inferences about  perceptual processes; 
any task which measures effects only after 
they are over runs the risk of  reflecting merely 
the final, conscious, result of  such processing 
and not the processes by which that final 
interpretation was achieved. Certainly the 
Bobrow and Bell experiments, which provide 
the strongest support  for the Idiom List 
Hypothesis, fall into this category. It is not 
really surprising that  the comprehension 
device decides that  the appropria te  meaning 
for a word string is an idiomatic one in the 
context o f  a set o f  idioms, and a literal one 
in the context o f  a literal “ set.’’ Such a 
decision, however, does not at all mean that 
we should assume that two different types of 
processes are occurring in these circum­
stances. Rather,  we merely need postulate a 
decision device which considers context in a 
pragmatic manner  and which allows the most 
likely of  several computed meanings to be 
made available to conscious access.
putat ion o f  a literal meaning and the access 
of  a lexical (idiomatic) meaning should be 
undertaken simultaneously for the idiom 
string. The access of  the lexical interpretation 
should conclude far more quickly than the 
access and computa t ion  o f  the relationships 
am ong  the several lexical items in the literal 
interpretation of  the idiom. Similarly, the 
lexicalized idiom meaning should also be 
recovered before the access and computa t ion  
of  relationships between words in the literal 
control phrase. Hence, if the Lexical Repre­
sentation Hypothesis is to hold, idiomatic 
phrases should be consistently classified as 
“ acceptable" more quickly than literal con­
trol strings. (Note that the same outcome, 
again in support  of  Lexical Representation 
Hypothesis,  would be predicted by a slight 
variation of  this argument.  In this, both the 
lexicalized idiom and the literal analysis are 
undertaken simultaneously on the idiom 
string, thus providing two interpretations for 
that string. Because the control string will
What is needed in order to better evaluate have only a single interpretation, one would
the candidate hypotheses, then, is a task 
designed to tap the time course of  the access 
and processing o f  literal and idiomatic strings 
more closely. To this end, we employed a task 
which required subjects to decide whether or 
not a visually presented string of  words 
formed a meaningful, natural  phrase in 
English. The rationale behind this Phrase
expect that, on the average, classification 
responses to the idiom would be faster than 
those made to the control. Tha t  is, anv one
J
of  the two simultaneously generated inter­
pretations will suffice for a decision in the 
case of  an idiom, but only one is available for 
the control:  thus, in a horse-race model the 
idiom will win. Again, this result will hold
Classification Task is relatively straightfor- only if the Lexical Representation Hypothe- 
w a r d : the task requires that candidate strings sis is correct and both interpretations are 
be analyzed for sensibleness as a unit. If accessed simultaneously for the idiom string.)
idiomatic meanings are computed by refer- Finally, as work exists which suggests that
enee to a special idiom list, via some special the initial port ions of a word are often critical 
mode of  processing which is instigated follow- for its access (Mehler,  Segui, & Carey, 1978;
ing an at tempt at literal computat ion,  the 
phrase classification decisions should take
Taft & Forster, 1975), two types o f  control 
word strings were created in order to examine
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the possible bases upon which a putative 
lexical interpretation of  an idiom might be 
recognized.
E x p e r i m e n t  1
M ethod
Subjects. Twenty undergraduates from 
Tufts University participated in the experi­
ment as partial fulfillment of  an introductory 
psychology course requirement.
Materials. The experimental materials con­
sisted of  23 grammatical idiomatic word 
strings which were matched (yoked) with 23 
grammatical control word strings. The ex- 
perimental idiom strings each had approxi­
mately equal a priori biases toward their 
literal and idiomatic interpretations, as deter­
mined by a pretest given to an independent 
group of  22 Tufts undergraduates.  In this 
pretest, subjects were shown 100 idiomatic 
and “ filler" word strings one at a time and 
were required to indicate the first meaning 
they thought of  for each stimulus. Word 
strings were considered approximately equi- 
biased if the least frequent interpretation 
constituted no less than 25%  of all reported 
interpretations (mean percentage of least 
frequent interpretation for all experimental 
materials was 42 %).
The control strings were constructed by 
replacing one word in each idiomatic string 
(either the first or the last word) with a word 
of  the same length (in both letters and syl­
lables) and of equal or higher frequency (Ku- 
cera & Francis, 1967, norms). The resulting 
control strings each formed a literal, gram- 
matically acceptable, and common,  English 
phrase. For  12 of  the 23 control strings, the 
first word of  the idiom was replaced (e.g., 
wrap it up/lift it up), and for the other 11 
control strings, the last word of the idiom 
string was changed (e.g., break the ice/break 
the cup). See Appendix 1 for a list o f  the 
experimental materials.
In addition, 30 acceptable English word 
strings which were not idiomatic were in­
eluded in the study in order to minimize the 
ratio of  idiom-to-nonidiom strings. Finally, 
76 word strings which did not form an accept­
able (grammatical) English phrase (i.e., 
“ stranger is du r ing" ;  “ destroy be however") 
were created. These non phrase strings were 
roughly equivalent to the acceptable-phrase 
strings in both number  of  syllables and n u m ­
ber o f  words.
Procedure. The 152 word strings were pre­
sented in random order on a C R T  display 
screen to each of  the subjects. Each string was 
displayed for 2 seconds, with the interval 
between successive presentations (following 
a response) varying randomly between 0.5 
and 2.0 seconds. Materials presentation was 
under control o f  a PDP8/e minicomputer.  
The subjects were instructed that  they would 
see a series of  short strings of words on the 
display screen, and that their task was to 
decide, as quickly as possible, whether or not 
each of  these strings formed a meaningful,  
“ na tu ra l"  phrase in English. Subjects were to 
indicate their decision by pressing one of  two 
buttons which were in front of  them. Five 
practice phrases were then given. (No subject 
had any difficulty in performing the phrase 
classification.) Response latencies were meas­
ured beginning with the onset of  each phrase 
and measurement was terminated by each 
subjects' button press. Response latencies and 
classification responses were collected and 
stored by a PDP8/e computer  (see Onifer, 
Hirshkowitz,  & Swinney, 1978, for descrip­
tion of  the relevant psycholinguistic software 
package).
Following the experiment, subjects were 
debriefed and questioned as to whether they 
had been consciously aware (during the ex­
periment) of  the presence of  idioms in the 
materials.
Results
Mean latencies for correct responses were 
computed for each subject for each experi­
mental condition. These were subjected to an
528 SWINNEY AND CUTLER
analysis of  variance with Phrase Type (Idiom 
vs Control)  and Substitution Position (First 
vs Last Word Change) as main variables. The 
mean latencies taken across subjects for the 
four conditions formed by the interaction of  
these variables are displayed in Table 1.
T A B L E  I
M e a n  L a t e n c i e s  ( i n  m i l l i s e c o n d s ) f o r  C e l l s  o f  t h e  
P h r a s e  T y p e  x S u b s t i t u t i o n  P o s i t i o n  I n t e r a c t i o n
Substi tut ion posit ion
Phrase type First word Last word
Idiom 918 995
Contro l 992 1064
The main effect for Phrase Type, F( 1, 19) =  
48 .5 , /? <  .0001, and Substitution Position, 
F(\,  19) =  16.5617 , /jx .0007 , were each sig­
nificant in analyses employing subjects as the 
random factor. The interaction of  these vari­
ables was not significant, F(\ ,  19) =  0 .02 . 
M inF' values (Clark, 1973) computed from 
independent analyses o f  variance employing 
subjects (see above) and items as random 
factors were also calculated for these data. 
Again, both main effects for Phrase Type, 
mmF'(  1, 49 ) =  4 .29 , p < .05 , and for Substi tu­
tion Position, m in F \ \ ,  58 ) =  4 .06 , / ; < . 05 , 
were significant. The interaction of  these 
variables did not approach significance under 
niinF' analysis.
Error  rates were also tallied for each sub­
ject in the experiment. The error rates were 
nearly identical for the four experimental 
conditions, and the overall error rate in the 
experiment was extremely low (3.96%).
Discussion
For  both of  the Substitution Position con­
ditions we find that grammatical  idioms are 
judged to be acceptable English phrases far 
more quickly than are their matched controls. 
These data provide clear support  for the 
Lexical Representation Hypothesis;  as re­
covery of  any acceptable meaning was suffi­
cient for a positive classification response, 
and as the access o f  any single lexical item 
(the lexicalized idiom) can undoubtedly be 
accomplished more quickly than the access 
and computat ion of  the relationships among 
the several words in a (control) phrase, the 
results support  a model in which idioms are 
stored and accessed as lexical items. In addi­
tion, at least in the most parsimonious ac­
count,  this lexicalized meaningcan be assumed 
to be accessed simultaneously with co m p u ta ­
tion of  the literal meaning for the idiom. Note 
that  if the meaning of an idiom were com- 
puted from the individual items in the phrase, 
or via an idiom processing mode coming into 
play following attempted literal analysis, 
then idioms would be recognized no faster 
than the control phrases.
Lest the argument arise that the reported 
effects w'ere obtained because our  subjects 
were always in a special idiom processing 
mode (in which case the Idiom List H ypothe­
sis might still be viable), we performed two 
additional analyses. In the first we analyzed 
the very first occurrence of  an idiom in the 
experiment, along with its matched control,  
for each subject. As presentation was random 
for each subject, the particular idiom which 
occurred first differed for most subjects. Also, 
in a number  of  cases the control for the “ first" 
idiom preceded the idiom itself. The mean 
reaction time for the first idiom seen by each 
subject, as computed across all subjects, was 
948 milliseconds and the mean reaction time 
for the matched control phrases to these 
idioms was 999 milliseconds. This difference 
was significant, /(19 ) =  2 .746 , / ; < .01. Thus,  
even prior to occurrence of  any material 
which could put the subject into an “ idiom 
mode,"  the idiom processing main effect is 
similar in direction and strength to the
C—-
results found across all materials.
In addition, analysis of the post-test ques- 
tionaire revealed that  11 of  the 20 subjects 
admitted to some (although often doubtful) 
awareness of  the presence of  idioms at some 
point during the experiment. A separate, post
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hoc. analysis was undertaken on the data  
from “ aware" and “ unaware"  subjects in 
order  to discover whether this distinction was 
responsible for processing differences which 
might have been obscured in the original 
analysis. Substitution Position Conditions 
were collapsed for this analysis. F o r  those 
subjects who had some awareness of  the 
presence o f  idioms, mean reaction time to the 
grammatical  idioms was 936 milliseconds and 
mean reaction time to the control phrases was 
1000 milliseconds. For  those subjects who 
were not aware of  idioms in the experiment, 
mean reaction times to idioms and their con-
the initial word differed. In any event, such 
speculation is irrelevant given the obtained 
da ta ;  the idiom/control effect is equivalent 
under the two substitution conditions and it 
appears that the absolute reaction time 
differences obtained between these conditions 
merely reflect the overall levels of  difficulty 
of  the two sets o f  materials.
Finally, the notion o f  transit ional p ro b a ­
bility needs to be discussed in relation to these 
materials and results. It might be felt that the 
advantage shown by idioms in this task is 
simply one caused by there being a higher 
likelihood of occurrence for the individual
lexical items forming the idiom phrase than 
for those items forming the control phrase. 
In its simplest form, this hypothesis must be 
wrong:  the substitution controls were chosen 
with care to avoid any such bias (the substi­
tuted word was always a word of  the same 
form class and o f  equal or  higher frequency 
than the word it replaced in the idiom). Thus, 
under this hypothesis one would expect that 
the control phrase might actually have de­
veloped a statistical edge on frequency of  
occurrence as a unit. However, it might be 
felt that it is \hz sequence of  items in the phrase 
that is critical here, not just  the summed fre­
quencies of  individual items. It can be noted 
that the notion of  phrasal frequency based on 
transitional probability can be relatively 
easily explained and motivated by the con­
cept that we have adop ted— that they have 
lexical status. However, we felt that it would 
be best to examine some evidence which would 
speak directly to the role of  transitional p rob a ­
bility between words in these materials.
To this end, a test was constructed in which 
the 23 idiom phrases, each with its final word 
omitted, were presented on a typed list to 40 
Tufts University undergraduates.  These m a t ­
erials were randomly intermixed with 100 
“ filler” incomplete phrases. The composition 
of  the filler materials was in the same ratio as 
time between an idiom and its control phrase that o f  the experimental materials with 
in which only the final word differed than for respect to the number  of  words in each phrase.
trols were 981 and 1062 milliseconds, respec­
tively. The data  were submitted to an un­
weighted means unequal n analysis of  vari­
ance. in which the main effect for Phrase Type 
( Idiom vs Control) was significant, F( 1, 18) =  
48.43. p <  .0001, but both the main effect for 
Awareness G roup  and the Awareness G ro u p  
x Phrase Type interaction failed to reach sig­
nificance (F(l ,  18) =  0.572 and 0.697, respec­
tively).
In all. it appears there is no basis for believ­
ing that our subjects were in any “ special" 
idiom processing mode in this experiment;  
subjects who might have been in such a mode 
due to “ awareness" of  idioms actually per­
formed no differently than those who could 
not have been in such a mode on that basis. 
These results appear  to substantiate the a rgu­
ment in favor of the Lexical Representation 
Hypothesis.
A brief word concerning the first vs last 
word Substitution Position variable is in 
order. This variable was originally included 
as a control for the possibility that the initial 
morpheme in an idiom might be a critical 
factor in the access o f  an idiomatic meaning. 
For example, it was thought that this initial 
morpheme might be sufficient for initiating 
access o f  an idiomatic meaning. If true, one 
might expect a far greater difference in access
an idiom and control phrase in which only The purpose o f  the filler materials was to de-
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crease the possibility of  subjects noticing that 
all the experimental materials could be 
idioms. In addition, the 11 control phrases 
which were in the First Word Substitution 
Position condition were added randomly to 
this list, again omitting the final word of  the 
phrase. Subjects were required to give the 
first word that they thought o f  after reading 
each incomplete phrase. The number  of  
completion responses which were identical 
to either the idiom or the control materials 
was tabulated as a percentage of  the total 
number  of  responses. The results fell into 
rather evenly divisible categories. For  10 o f  
the 23 idiom/control pairs the number  o f  co m ­
pletion responses to the idiom and its control 
was identical. For  two cases the control 
materials had a higher frequency o f  response 
completion than their associated idioms. The 
remaining 11 idiom/control pairs had higher 
response completion percentages for the 
idiom than for the control phrases (ranging 
from 3 to 40%  greater). For  purposes of  com ­
parison, the data were divided into two 
groups: one group comprised the 10 idiom/ 
control pairs which had equal completion 
percentages and the other group was com ­
prised of  the 10 idiom/control pairs with the 
largest idiom completion advantage over 
their respective controls. Another  analysis o f  
variance was performed on the reaction time 
data examining the two Response Comple­
tion categories as a main effect. The results 
are quite straightforward. The main effect for 
Phrase Type is significant, F( 1, 19) =  80.36, 
p < .0001, as was the main effect for Response 
Completion category, F( 1, 19) =  49.7, / ; <  
.0001. However, the critical Response C o m ­
pletion x Phrase Type interaction was not at 
all significant, F{ 1, 19) =  0.0848. The mean 
reaction time data for each of  these conditions 
can be seen in Table 2.
In short, there is no evidence that transi­
tional probability per se plays a role in the 
effect reported here for idioms. Rather, it
M e a n  R e a c t i o n  T i m e  ( i n  m i l l i s e c o n d s ) t o  I d i o m  a n d  
C o n t r o l  P h r a s e s  a s  a F u n c t i o n  o f  R e s p o n s e  C o m ­
p l e t i o n  ( T r a n s i t i o n a l  P r o b a b i l i t y ) E x a m i n a t i o n
T A B L E  2
Response complet ion category
No idiom/ Idiom advan tage
Phrase  type control  difference over control
Idiom 903 1002
Contro l 998 1107
the processing and representation of  idioms.
It is possible that the findings reported here, 
while relatively straightforward, still may not 
constitute the complete and final picture of 
the processing of  idioms. A possible basis for 
qualification of  our  conclusions might lie, for 
example, in examining variations in types of  
idioms. The concept of  linguistic frozenness 
discussed earlier appears to be the most suit­
able framework within which to examine this 
possibility. Recall that Fraser (1974) has 
categorized idioms into an inclusive hier- 
archy according to the type and order of  
t ransformational  operations (with respect to 
s tandard transformational  generative g ram ­
mar) which idioms can undergo and still 
retain their idiomatic meaning. Thus, for 
example, Fraser has pointed out that phrasal 
idioms such as “ kick the bucket"  can undergo 
very simple transformational  change, such 
as that involved in producing the gerundive 
(“ John 's  kicking the bucket was tragic"), but 
will undergo few if any other changes. (For  
example, it fails to undergo simple passiviza- 
tion: “ The bucket was kicked by Jo h n "  does 
not retain the idiomatic meaning.) Idioms 
such as this are mildly frozen. Some idioms, 
such as “ to let off some s team" are considered 
by Fraser to be completely frozen, while 
others such as “ throw in the sponge" are 
virtually unfrozen— they can undergo most 
transformations.
appears that the lexicalization hypothesis is It is worth noting here that  no idioms can 
upheld as a strong and viable hypothesis for undergo all transformational operations and
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retain their idiomatic meanings. Further,  it 
should be noted that level o f  frozenness is 
completely independent of  whether or not 
an acceptable literal reading exists for the 
idioms— both “ grammatical"  and “ nongram- 
matical" idioms vary in their levels of 
frozenness.
It may be that the vagaries idioms display 
with respect to susceptibility to t ransforma­
tional change are, in fact, merely a result of  
operations which are allowable on similar, 
literal, phrases in the language; the fact that 
language has both properties of  plasticity and 
creativity could account for such generaliza­
tion in function. However, it may also be the 
case that  the lexical status of  idioms is a 
function o f  the categorization Fraser has 
noted. It may be, for example, that the more 
frozen an idiom is, the stronger its lexical 
status (in terms of. for example, access or 
retrieval routes). Overall, whatever the basis 
for this categorization, the questions of  how 
or whether such derived classifications are 
reflected in the underlying representation and 
comprehension of  idioms deserve investiga­
tion.
The data in Experiment 1 are taken on a 
set of  idioms which represent a wide but un ­
even spread of  frozenness and there are in­
sufficient numbers of  certain levels to allow 
for a reasonable test of  the hypotheses just  
proposed. For  this reason, a second experi­
ment was performed, one which explicitly 
examines the frozenness categorization with 
respect to lexical status.
E x p e r i m e n t  2
M ethod
Subjects. Forty-two undergraduate s tu­
dents from Tufts University participated in 
this study. Each was paid S I .50 for partici­
pation.
Materials. Twelve grammatical idiomatic 
phrases which were equibiased constituted 
the basic experimental materials for this study. 
(Determination of  bias was based on material
pretests and criteria identical to those des­
cribed in Experiment 1. Thirty-one Tufts 
University undergraduates participated in 
the pretest.) Three of  the experimental idioms 
were completely frozen (F 0)— that is, they 
could undergo no transformation and retain 
their idiomatic meaning. Another  three of  
these idioms constituted exemplars of  the 
most mild level of  frozenness (category 1 on 
Fraser 's  hierarchy). Another  three of  the 
idioms constituted exemplars of  an inter­
mediate level of  frozenness. The final three 
idioms were taken from Fraser 's  fifth level of 
frozenness ( F 5)— that of  maximum trans­
formational applicability. Appendix 2 dis­
plays the materials used in this experiment.
Each idiom was matched with a control 
word string which was created by exchanging 
either the first or the last word in the idiom 
with a word of  greater or equal frequency and 
of  equal length. The resulting word string 
control constituted a comm on and acceptable 
English phrase (refer to Experiment 1 for 
further details). In addition, 35 word strings 
which did not form acceptable English phrases 
were constructed.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to 
that reported in Experiment 1. Each subject 
was seated in a booth containing a visual dis- 
play unit and a pair of  response buttons. All 
idiom phrases, control phrases, and n on ­
phrase materials were presented in random 
order  to each subject. A PDP8/e minicom­
puter presented all materials with randomly 
varied intertrial intervals lasting from 0.5 to 
2.0 seconds. Subjects were instructed to 
determine, as quickly as possible, whether 
each word string was a permissible English 
phrase or  not and to press the appropriate  
button in front of him/her. Reaction times to 
these decisions were recorded by the PDP8/e 
computer.
Results
Individual means were calculated for each 
o f  the cells formed by the Phrase Type ( Idiom 
vs Control) x Frozenness Level variables.
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M e a n  R e a c t i o n  T i m e  ( i n  m i l l i s e c o n d s ) f o r  Id i o m  a n d  C o n t r o l  P h r a s e s  a t  F o u r
L e v e l s  o f  T r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l  F r o z e n n e s s
T A B L E  3
Level o f  linguistic frozenness
Comple le Si ron i» Mild Unfrozen
Phrase type ( F 0) (F .) <f 3> ( F 5>
Idiom 960 991 957 940
Contro l 1086 1068 1043 1041
The mean reaction times for cells of  this in­
teraction, calculated across subjects, are 
given in Table 3 . An analysis o f  variance was 
performed on these data  with Phrase Type 
and Frozenness Level as main effects. The 
main eiTect for Phrase Type was significant, 
F( 1, 41 ) =  54 .38 , p  < .0001. This was also sig­
nificant under minF' analysis, minF'i 1, 45 ) =  
5 .03 , p < .05 . The main effects for Frozenness 
Level and the Frozenness Level x Phrase 
Type interaction were not significant; F{3, 
123) =  2.56 and 1.99 , respectively.
Discussion o f  Experiment 2 and General Dis­
cussion
The results of  Experiment 2 show no main 
eiTect for the variable of  Frozenness. Simi­
larly, this variable does not interact with the 
basic Idiom/Control  Phrase Type effect found 
in Experiment 1 and replicated in this study. 
This does not mean that linguistic descrip­
tions of  frozenness have no perceptual 
validity, but rather that the susceptibility 
these idioms show to transformational change 
is a factor applicable to these items as lexical 
items. That  is, acceptance of  the Lexical 
Representation Hypothesis in no way con­
tradicts the notion that restrictions may 
exist upon insertion or the use of  certain 
idioms (lexical items) in the grammar.  H ow ­
ever, the results do suggest that idioms are to 
some extent unified with respect to access, 
retrieval, and representation in the lexicon.
In sum, then, it appears as though we have
achieved reasonably strong support  for the 
Lexical Representation Hypothesis: idioms 
appear  to be stored and accessed as lexical 
items, not from some special list that  is dis­
tinct from the lexicon nor by a special process­
ing mode which comes into play when literal 
analysis fails. Further,  the categorization of  
liguistic frozenness, which has very real 
reflections in higher order linguistic organiza- 
tion, does not appear  to be a basis for differ­
ential access of  idioms in the lexicon. It 
should be noted, however, that the categori­
zation provided by Fraser (1974) which we 
tested is not the only one available, and there 
is certainly a lot of  mushy theoretical ground 
around the concepts of  “ loosely fixed" (un­
frozen) phrases.
It appears worthwhile to reconsider, at 
least briefly, the previous studies on idioms 
in order to place the current results in per­
spective. Both the results of  Bobrow and Bell 
(1973) and of  Brannon (Note 2) provided 
evidence which they took as support  for the 
Idiom List Hypothesis, evidence based in the 
one case on post-perceptual reports of  “ first 
meaning perceived in context," and in the 
other on “ speed to compare meanings” 
(again, a post-perceptual measure). Both 
results, in fact, make a great deal of  sense. 
However, they do not appear  to reflect per­
ceptual processing of  idiomatic phrases. The 
Bobrow and Bell task, as suggested in the 
introduction, appears to reflect the results of  
a mental decision as to the most appropria te  
meaning to be brought to conscious aware-
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ness. Similarly, the Brannon experiment re­
quired subjects to compare meanings of  two 
idiom strings and of  two nonidiom strings. If
C /  I-»"
lexical access is immediately undertaken for 
a grammatical idiom, and literal analysis is 
also begun, there would simply be more 
meanings to compare for two idiom strings 
than there are for two literal control strings. 
This situation could account for her finding 
o f  longer decision times for idiom com par i ­
sons. This suggestion is supported by other 
data  Brannon reports. In a second experi­
ment, she found that it took longer to co m ­
pare ambiguous nonidioms than unambigu­
ous nonidioms. Thus, in this task, a com par i­
son involving many meanings is shown to 
take longer than comparisons involving only 
a few meanings. In all, it appears that post- 
perceptual tasks are often simply not ap p ro ­
priate for providing evidence about  percep­
tual access; a task which more immediately 
reflects the processes under question, such as 
that used in the present paper, often finds 
results which are undetected by later-occur­
ring tasks.
The hypothesis that idioms are represented 
lexically has had recent, although somewhat 
indirect, support.  Ortony, Schallert. Rey­
nolds, and Antos (1978) report that com ­
prehension of  idiomatic phrases in their 
idiom sense took no longer (and in fact was 
often faster) than in their literal sense, a 
result they took to suggest that idioms and 
metaphors  require no special processing for 
comprehension. Certainly these results fit 
well with a Lexical Representation H ypo­
thesis.
It is worth noting that the analysis we have 
applied to idiom processing is the same 
analysis that we would presumably wish to 
apply to certain other complicated language 
forms. For example, one might well expect 
comprehension of  nominal compounds  
(shrimpboat.  hotdog) to occur through lexical 
representation and access rather than through 
access from a special “ nominal compound 
list" or from some attempted “ nonliteral"
analysis. As a great number of  nominal co m ­
pounds are not “ literal" in the sense of  their 
meaning being a simple combination of  the 
literal meanings of  their component  m o r ­
phemes, they present a problem similar to that 
provided by idioms for the comprehension 
device.
In addition, our  lexical representation 
hypothesis fits well with some relatively 
recent data  on m etaphor  processing. Harris 
(1976) has reported finding no difference 
between latency to initiate paraphrase  of  
metaphoric  quotat ions and equivalent non- 
metaphoric  quotations.  He interprets these 
results as support  for a model in which (non­
literal) metaphoric  processing takes place in 
parallel with attempted literal processing for 
m etaphor  strings. This, then, fits with the hy­
pothesis we have supported— that multiple 
computat ions  (both lexical and structural) 
can be simultaneously entertained by the 
comprehension device in processing idioms.
In all, it appears that idioms, like many 
other  problems which have been relegated to 
some sort of  “ special" process, may turn out 
to have very “ norm al"  processing solutions, 
at least once we elaborate more fully what the 
normal system can do.
A p p e n d i x  1: I d i o m  C o n t r o l  M a t e r i a l s
U s e d  in E x p e r i m e n t  1
break the ice/break the cup 
pain in the neck pain in the loot 
see the point/see the g roup  
out  o f  l ine/out o f  foodI
lost his marbles/ lost  his for tune
on the wagon/on  the train
out  o f  s ight /out  o f  shape
take him for a r ide/ take him for a beer
over  the hill/over the edue
in the dark / in  the east
kick the bucket/ lif t  the bucket
held up /open  up
spill the beans/cra te  the beans
see the light/get the light
put  him on/let  him on
cut it ou t / t ry  it out
strike ou t / th ro w n  out
hold on /m ove  on
pull his leg/lose his leg
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bail o u t /b a n g  out  
d ro p  it/save it 
wrap  it up/lift it up
A p p e n d i x  2 :  I d i o m / C o n t r o l  M a t e r i a l s
f o r  E x p e r i m e n t  2
Frozenness Level {Permissible Operations
Cited in Parentheses)
F 0 (can undergo  no operat ions)  
j u m p  in the lake/dive in the lake 
shake a lee/twist a leu 
fly a kite fix a kite 
Fj (adjunct ion only) 
climb the walls/paint  the walls 
kick the bucket/fill the bucket 
chew the fat /melt  the fat 
F 2 _4 (insertion, pe rm uta t ion ,  extract ion) 
break the ice break the cup 
give her a ring/give her a poem 
see the light/see the g roup  
F 5 (can undergo  most operat ions)  
bury the hatchet  bury the coffinswr
see the point/see the water  
spill the beans/spill  the juice
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